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Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts' Powers of Inquiry
Under Article 3(a) of the United States-United
Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty
A common provision of extradition treaties between the United
States and other countries is the political offense exception.1 This excep-
tion allows the courts of the country holding the requested person to
deny an extradition request if they determine that the offense for which
extradition is sought is of a political nature. Using this provision, courts
in the United States have refused in some cases to extradite members of
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to Northern Ireland. 2 Because of this
reluctance, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a supple-
mentary treaty that effectively eliminates the political offense exception
in cases involving citizens of the United Kingdom.
When President Reagan submitted the treaty to Congress for ratifi-
cation, the United States Senate ratified an amended version. While con-
tinuing to limit the political offense exception, the amended version
contains a provision that allows United States courts to examine the jus-
tice system of Northern Ireland before permitting the extradition of fugi-
tives to that country.3 Such judicial inquiries will focus on whether the
system of justice in Northern Ireland is prejudiced against the person
sought to be extradited.
Part I of this note examines this new provision of the Supplementary
Treaty and explores the legislative intent behind the amendment. Part II
looks at how the judicial system in Northern Ireland treats those sus-
pected of terrorist activities. Part III recommends a standard that courts
can use to evaluate the system of justice in Northern Ireland and its ef-
fects on the rights of citizens in that country. Part IV concludes that the
1 132 CONG. REC. S9149 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Pell).
Two broad categories of political offenses exist: pure and relative. Pure political offenses are
acts aimed directly at the prevailing government, and do not resemble ordinary crimes. These in-
clude treason, sedition, and espionage, and are frequently excluded from the roster of extraditable
crimes in an extradition treaty. Relative political offenses are otherwise common crimes with polit-
ical motives or components. Extradition litigation usually concerns relative offenses.
Three broad tests are used to determine whether a particular offense falls within the political
offense designation. The French "objective" test renders an offense nonextraditable only if it di-
rectly injured the government's rights. It does not consider the motives of the accused. The Swiss
"proportionality" test considers various subjective factors when determining whether an offense is a
political offense. The Swiss test considers the offender's political motivation, the circumstances of
the crime, and the level of the political elements of the crime. The Anglo-American "incidence" test
generally requires that some sort of political disturbance exist at the time of the crime and that the
crime was committed "incidental to" the particular disturbance.
For an excellent summary of the various legal standards surrounding the political offense excep-
tion, see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792-803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986) and
sources cited therein.
2 See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
3 The text of the amended version of the Supplementary Treaty is available at S. EXEc. REP. No.
17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1986), 132 CONG. REC. S9120 (daily ed.July 16, 1986) and as a British
statutory instrument under the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (Application of Provisions)
(United States of America) Order, S.1. 1986, No. 2146, Sched. 1.
justice system in Northern Ireland deprives citizens of those basic rights
that democratic countries should guarantee and is prejudiced against
those involved in politically motivated crimes. United States courts
should, therefore, continue to deny extradition requests for those for-
merly protected by the political offense exception until the British gov-
ernment changes the justice system of Northern Ireland to sufficiently
protect the human rights of the citizens of that country.
I. The Amended Version of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty
Between the United States and the United Kingdom
A. The Supplementary Treaty
On July 17, 1986, the United States Senate ratified the Supplemen-
tary Extradition Treaty4 between the United States and the United King-
dom. 5 The signers' intent behind the Supplementary Treaty was to
eliminate the political offense exception to extradition with respect to
certain serious violent crimes against persons or property.6 The Supple-
mentary Treaty, once signed, was submitted to the Senate for ratifica-
tion.7 The reduction of the political offense exception in the treaty
created substantial controversy in hearings considering the Supplemen-
tary Treaty.8
4 The complete name of the treaty is: Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Signed at London on 8 June 1972 [hereinafter
Supplementary Treaty). The Supplementary Treaty was ratified by the United States and Great Brit-
ain, and entered into force December 23, 1986. 87 DEP'T ST. BuLL., Feb. 1987, at 89.
5 The resolution of ratification passed by a vote of 87-10. 132 CONG. REC. S9273 (daily ed.July
17, 1986). The British Parliament approved the amended version of the Supplementary Treaty on
November 25, 1986. United States of America (Extradition) (Amendment) Order, S.I. 1986, No.
2020. The amended version was incorporated into the Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26.
Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (Application of Provisions) (United States of America) Order,
S.I. 1986, No. 2146.
6 S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986). These crimes were: murder, voluntary
manslaughter, assault causing grievous bodily harm; kidnapping, abduction, serious unlawful deten-
tion, taking of hostages; offenses involving the use of bombs, grenades, rockets, firearms, and incen-
diary devices; and attempts to commit or conspiracy to commit any of these offenses. Id. at 15. Also
excluded from consideration as political offenses were offenses listed in certain multilateral conven-
tions dealing with air piracy, hijacking, and protection of diplomats. Id. at 6-7.
7 The State Department signed the Supplementary Treaty onJune 25, 1985 and submitted it to
the Senate for ratification on July 17, 1985. S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
8 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Supplementary Treaty and
considered various proposed amendments. Id. at 1. Proposed amendments included one that dis-
tinguished attacks against civilians from attacks against soldiers and one that made the treaty pro-
spective only, thus inapplicable to those then awaiting extradition. Id. at 3.
The treaty was a response by the United States and British executive branches to several recent
federal court decisions denying requests by the United Kingdom for the extradition of members of
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), a separate and generally more violent wing of the
IRA, accused or convicted of committing violent acts. In general, the denied requests were for PIRA
members who had committed violent acts against British forces occupying Northern Ireland. The
courts routinely granted extradition where the victims of such acts were civilians. The courts deny-
ing extradition determined that the acts which formed the basis of the extradition requests were
political in nature; therefore, the requests could not be granted. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d
776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Mc-
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After hearings were held, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
submitted, and the Senate ratified, an amended version of the Supple-
mentary Treaty. While still limiting the political offense exception, arti-
cle 3(a) of the submitted treaty contains what is potentially an even more
powerful tool for courts to use when considering extradition requests
from the United Kingdom.
B. Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty
1. Legislative History
The amendment to the original Supplementary Treaty, article 3(a),
reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty,
extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satis-
faction of the competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the
evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been made with a
view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality,
Mullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S9146-147 (daily
ed. July 16, 1986).
In Quinn, William Joseph Quinn petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus follow-
ing the extradition magistrate's approval of the United Kingdom's request for extradition. The dis-
trict court found that the offenses for which extradition was being sought were nonextraditable
political offenses and denied the request for extradition. 783 F.2d at 786. The court of appeals
reversed because some of Quinn's offenses took place in England. "The crimes did not take place
within a territorial entity in which a group of nationals were seeking to change the form of the
government under which they live; rather the offenses took place in a different geographical loca-
tion." Id. at 818.
In Mackin, the extradition magistrate denied the United Kingdom's request for the extradition
of Desmond Mackin, charged with the attempted murder of a British soldier and related firearms
possession crimes. The circuit court upheld the denial of extradition, finding that the magistrate's
denial of extradition was unappealable. 668 F.2d at 130. The appellate court also noted that the
government was free to refile extradition requests because extradition decisions have no resjudicata
effect. Id. at 128-29.
In Doherty, the extradition magistrate denied the extradition request because the magistrate de-
termined that the murder of the British soldier for which Doherty had been convicted was a political
offense within the meaning of the treaty. 599 F. Supp. at 277. When the government attempted to
appeal this decision, the court again held that the decision of the magistrate was unappealable. 786
F.2d at 495.
In McMullen, the district court refused the extradition request on similar grounds; the bombing
of British Army barracks was found to be a political act in light of the background of violence and
insurrection then taking place in Northern Ireland. McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG.
During the advice and consent proceedings in the Senate, the limitation of the political offense
exception was a source of considerable debate. Many senators opposed the limitation of the excep-
tion. See generally 132 CONG. REc. S9251-273 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) and 132 CONG. REC. S9119-
171 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (Senate debates preceding ratification of the Supplementary Treaty).
Some senators sympathized with the goals of those seeking change in Northern Ireland. See 132
CONG. REC. S9164 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), 132 CONG. REC. S9258
(daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Others were wary of eliminating the protection
of the political offense exception from extradition treaties in general. In response to this concern,
the Senate passed a declaration stating that:
The Senate... declares that it will not give its advice and consent to any treaty that would
narrow the political offense exception with a totalitarian or other non-democratic regime
and that nothing in the Supplementary Treaty with the United Kingdom shall be considered
a precedent by the executive branch or the Senate for other treaties.
132 CONG. REc. S9120 (daily ed.July 16, 1986) (text of the resolution of ratification). Some senators
opposed what they considered to be an attempt to limit the power of the judiciary in extradition
cases. Unsuccessful efforts were made to retain the full political offense exception. See, e.g., 132
CONG. REc. S9119-171 (daily ed.July 16, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. S9251-277 (daily ed.July 17, 1986).
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or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at
his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.9
Article 3(a) thus empowers United States courts to evaluate the justice
system of the requesting country when considering extradition requests.
The clearest expression of the purpose of article 3(a) is found in a
colloquy between Senators Kerry, Biden, and Lugar that took place dur-
ing a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting. In the exchange,
Senator Biden indicated that despite the fact that the requested person is
otherwise subject to extradition under the treaty,
the defendant will have an opportunity in Federal court to introduce
evidence that he or she would personally, because of their race, reli-
gion, nationality or political opinion, not be able to get a fair trial be-
cause of the court system or any other aspect of the judicial system in
the requesting country.' 0
Citing the unique nature of the system of justice in Northern Ireland,
Senator Biden noted that article 3(a) was intended to "create a right of
inquiry into the fairness of a foreign judicial system."' " Accordingly,
courts must now determine how they will employ this new power in fu-
ture extradition proceedings.
2. Effects of Article 3(a)
Article 3(a) creates an unprecedented power of inquiry in the federal
courts.12 It will confer on the courts the responsibility to question both
the motive underlying the extradition request and the fairness of the ju-
dicial process of the requesting country. 13 This investigation is triggered
only when the person sought for extradition presents evidence of that
prejudice or unfairness.' 4 Courts, therefore, cannot conduct this review
sua sponte.
Immediate and long-term consequences attend this power of in-
quiry. The immediate consequence is apparent; where the court finds
that the requesting country's system of justice is unfair in light of the
article 3(a) criteria of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, it
9 132 CONG. REc. S9171 (dailyed.July 16, 1986). The language is based on a similar provision
in the British Fugitive Offenders Act which legislates extradition proceedings between Great Britain
and members of the Commonwealth. 132 CONG. REC. S9261 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
10 S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1986). The colloquy was included in the
report to clarify the meaning and intent of article 3(a). 132 CONG. REc. S9260 (daily ed. July 17,
1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
11 132 CONG. REC. S9260-261 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Biden). See also infra
notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
12 "There is no right of inquiry in any of the other 96 extradition treaties that we have on the
books." 132 CONG. REc. S9260 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
13 "The so-called Ninoy Aquino test involves not only the issue of trumped-up charges, but also
the issue of due process and the fairness of the system ofjustice to which a fugitive would be extra-
dited." Id. at S9253 (statement of Sen. Kerry). The test set forth in article 3(a) is sometimes called
the "Ninoy Aquino test." In 1982 the Reagan administration withdrew a similar proposed extradi-
tion treaty with the government of the Philippines amid concerns that Aquino could not get a fair
trial if he were returned to the Philippines. Id.
14 The language of article 3(a) requires that the "person sought establishe[s] ... to a preponder-
ance of the evidence" the existence of the unfairness or prejudice. 132 CONG. REc. S9120 (daily ed.
July 16, 1986).
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will deny the request for extradition. The possible long-term conse-
quence of this power of inquiry will be to encourage the requesting gov-
ernment to eliminate any prejudicial or unfairly punitive aspects of its
justice system. Only if the requesting government makes such changes
can it be assured of the extradition of fugitives sought to be prosecuted
or punished under its own system of justice.' 5
C. The Scope of Inquiry Under Article 3(a)
The intended scope of judicial inquiry under article 3(a) is not lim-
ited to a review of the requesting country's court system; rather, the in-
quiry should extend to the entire justice system of that country. 16 The
entire justice system includes pretrial procedures such as arrest and de-
tention procedures, search and seizure policies, and approved methods
of interrogation and crowd control, 17 as well as trial features such as the
jury system, rules of evidence, and sentencing practices.18 If the justice
system of the requesting country does not meet "minimal standards
within a democratic context" the request for extradition should be
denied. 9
II. The Justice System in Northern Ireland
The justice system of Northern Ireland is in great part a creature of
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978 (EPA).20 The
EPA consolidated much of Northern Ireland's emergency criminal law
into a single act,2 ' and constitutes the basis for the levels of personal
rights and freedoms that citizens of Northern Ireland possess today.22
15 "The Committee on Foreign Relations is sending a strong signal to the court system of our
Nation that the standard ofjustice in Northern Ireland is unacceptable to us, until changed to reflect
basic safeguards for the individual." 132 CONG. REC. S9258 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Kerry).
16 With article 3(a) we are conferring upon a potential fugitive the right to introduce evi-
dence of the fairness of the administration ofjustice system in Northern Ireland .... This is
not a narrow provision. It is a very broad, and far-reaching provision that represents a
marked departure from past practice in extradition law and should be so interpreted by the
court system in this country.
Id. at S9254 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
17 Id. at S9260-61 (statement of Sen. Biden).
18 Id. at S9261.
19 "Does the administration ofjustice system meet even minimal standards within a democratic
context? If it does not, then the courts under article 3(a) have an obligation not to extradite." Id. at
S9257 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
20 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5. [hereinafter EPA].
21 The EPA consolidated the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, the Northern
Ireland (Young Persons) Act, 1974, and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment)
Act, 1975. (EPA, supra note 20, subtitle).
These acts were variously imposed following the reinstitution of direct British rule over North-
ern Ireland in 1972. They replaced the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland),
1922-33, originally a temporary body of law made permanent in 1933. The Special Powers Act was
itself "emergency" legislation; it conferred many of the same powers now granted by the EPA. Until
Britain restored direct rule in 1972, the Unionist government used the Special Powers Act almost
exclusively against Republican activists. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HiLLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE
CASE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND 39-40 (1975) [hereinafter LAW AND STATE].
22 The EPA has been supplemented to some extent by the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1984, ch. 8. [hereinafter PTA]. The PTA applies throughout the British Isles and is
a reaction to the general increase in terrorism in recent years. Although the PTA's restrictions on
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When compared with other parts of the United Kingdom, the British
government has severely curtailed these rights and freedoms in Northern
Ireland. According to the government, such curtailment is a legitimate
response to the character and scale of "terrorist activities" in the
North.23
A. Specific Restrictions on Personal Liberties Because of the EPA
1. Pretrial
The restrictions placed on the personal liberties of the citizens of
Northern Ireland affect virtually every citizen and are a part of everyday
life. Security forces such as soldiers and constables have the power to
stop and question any person in Northern Ireland.24 The person de-
tained must answer "to the best of his knowledge and ability" any ques-
tions asked of him or face summary conviction and imprisonment for up
to six months and a fine of up to four hundred pounds. 25 A person who
fails to stop on the command of soldiers risks being shot.
26
Another intrusion on personal rights occurs when a person is ar-
rested in Northern Ireland. A police officer may arrest without a warrant
anyone he suspects of being a terrorist. 27 To effect the arrest, the officer
is allowed to make a warrantless search of any premises where he be-
lieves the suspect is located.28 Once arrested, the suspect may be held in
custody for up to seventy-two hours during which the police typically in-
terrogate the detainee. 29
personal rights are substantial, they are incidental in Northern Ireland when compared to those of
the EPA. Together, these two acts create the chief restrictions on personal rights and freedoms in
Northern Ireland.
The PTA gives the police the power to arrest those persons whom they have "reasonable
grounds" for suspecting are involved in terrorism. The initial period of arrest is 48 hours; the Secre-
tary of State may extend this period five additional days. PTA §§ 12(4),(5). The police, therefore,
do not need a warrant and can detain a person arrested under the PTA for up to seven days before
they must file a charge. Approximately 10% of those arrested in Northern Ireland are arrested
under authority of the PTA. Walsh, Arrest and Interrogation: Northern Ireland 1981, 9 J. L. & Soc'Y 37,
41 (1982).
23 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURE TO DEAL WrrH TERRORIST AcTv-
ITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, CMND. SER. 5, No. 5185, at 34 (Lord Diplock, Chairman) [herein-
after Diplock Report]; REPORT OF A COMMITEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CML LIBERTIES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1975, CMND. SER.
5, No. 5847, at 22 (Lord Gardiner, Chairman) [hereinafter Gardiner Report].
24 EPA, supra note 20, § 18.
25 Id. At common law, which otherwise applies in the rest of Great Britain, there is no compara-
ble power to stop and no duty to answer. CURRENT LAw STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 18, general note (1978).
Current Law Statutes Annotated contains privately annotated compilations of United Kingdom
statutory law. The annotations to the EPA were made by Kevin Boyle, LL.B., Barrister, Professor of
Law, University College, Galway.
26 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
27 EPA, supra note 20, § 11(1). "The power is exercisable on subjective suspicion only; there is
no requirement that the constable have reasonable grounds for an arrest." CURRENT LAw STAT.
ANN., ch. 5, § 11, general note (1978).
28 EPA, supra note 20, § 11(2). This power has been called "one of the most offensive oppres-
sions in the entire situation." C. RICE, DVDED IRELAND--A CAUSE FOR AMERICAN CONCERN 24
(1985). In the period from 1971 throughJune 1978 almost 300,000 warrantless home searches were
authorized. Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom- The Dilemma of Northern Ireland, 8 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 284, 294 (1982).
29 [T]he power is commonly used by the police as a means of detaining suspects for interro-
gation who may subsequently be rearrested under [§] 13 and charged with a scheduled
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Suspicion of terrorism is probably the most frequently invoked justi-
fication for an arrest because the attendant detention powers facilitate
the security forces' intelligence-gathering objectives.30 Related provi-
sions of the EPA allow the government to intern suspected terrorists
without trial for indefinite periods of time and provide only limited ad-
ministrative review as a procedural safeguard against abuse.3' Although
no one has been interned under these provisions of the EPA,3 2 the provi-
sions do exist and may be exercised by the Secretary of State upon ap-
proval of Parliament. The judiciary is not involved in this detention
process as the decisions concerning the indefinite detention without trial
of individual suspects are made at the executive level.
3 3
The EPA grants further powers of arrest to security forces where
suspicion of criminal activity exists.34 The forces do not need a warrant
and must possess only a low level of suspicion before arresting a sus-
pect.3 5 The police have the power to conduct a warrantless search of
premises where they believe the person sought is located; the army, on
the other hand, must suspect that the person is a terrorist before it may
conduct a similar search.3 6 The police may seize anything they find dur-
ing such a search if they believe the object is connected with a crime;3 7
the army has no such power.3 8 If the police arrest a suspect on suspicion
of criminal activity, he may be detained for up to forty-eight hours before
offence.... Deprivation of liberty under this section has been held not to be in conformity
with the requirements of art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
CURRENT LAW STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 11, general note (1978). The note continues, commenting that
the EPA as a whole is not in breach of the Convention because of the emergency situation in North-
ern Ireland.
30 One unscientific survey found that 48.3% of those arrested were arrested on the basis of § 11.
Walsh, supra note 22, at 41.
31 EPA, supra note 20, § 12 and sched. 1.
32 Internment was a regular practice of the Unionist government in Northern Ireland prior to
the institution of direct British rule in 1972. The government had used internment to deal with
military and political opponents at various times between 1922 and 1972. Catholic reaction to the
last period of internment in 1971 was violent and unified and contributed in great measure to the
imposition of direct British rule in March 1972. LAw AND STATE, supra note 21, at 55-58. Interest in
internment as a means of isolating those suspected of terrorism has waned to the point where the
provision has been allowed to lapse. See Walker, Irish Republican Prisoners - Political Detainees, Prisoners
of War or Common Criminals?, 1984 IR. JURIST 189, 191 n.18.
33 EPA, supra note 20, sched. 1. The Secretary of State is bound to consider a report prepared
by an advisor following a consideration of the suspected terrorist's situation. The suspect has no
right to appear before this advisor; if he is allowed to appear, he may not appear with counsel. Up to
70 days may elapse before the Secretary of State must issue a Detention Order which holds the
suspect in custody indefinitely. CURRENT LAw STAT. ANN., ch. 5, sched. 2, general note (1978).
De facto internment currently exists. A suspect charged with a scheduled offense and denied
bail can be held until trial. Due to increasing numbers of trials, the suspect may be forced to remain
in custody for up to two years before trial. Charges are often dropped just before trial and the
suspect is released. Thus, internment continues to some extent in practice, if not in name. C. RICE,
supra note 28, at 31-33.
34 EPA, supra note 20, § 13.
35 The EPA requires only that the arresting officer suspect that a crime covered by the EPA is,
was, or may be committed by the suspect. Id. at § 13(1). Note that arrest under § 13 may follow a
refusal to stop and/or answer questions on demand of security forces under § 18.
36 Id. § 14.
37 CURRENT LAw STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 13, general note, subs. (3) (1978).
38 Id. § 14, general note, subs. (3).
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he must be brought before a court or released.3 9 If the army arrests a
suspect it may hold him for a maximum period of four hours.
40
The arrest and detention process is an extremely important part of
the intelligence-gathering activities of the security forces in Northern Ire-
land. The security forces' ability to arrest and detain on their subjective
suspicion that a person may be a terrorist or may have committed a crime
means in effect that almost anyone in Northern Ireland is susceptible to
arrest at any time.41 For many Northern Irish citizens periodic arrest and
interrogation is a fact of life.42 The fact that few arrests result in charges
being filed 43 demonstrates that the security forces are abusing the arrest
powers granted by the EPA and infringing on the civil rights of Northern
Irish citizens in the process.
Once arrested and detained, a suspect is subject to the interrogation
powers of the authorities. Because these powers are not enumerated in
and, therefore, not limited by any specific provision of the EPA, abuses of
the civil rights of prisoners have occurred. In 1971 the British govern-
ment verified allegations of incidences of sensory deprivation and other
forms of mistreatment of detainees during interrogation.4 4 While subse-
quent attention has reduced the frequency and severity of such instances
of misconduct and certain reforms have been instituted in the form of
internal guidelines for interrogation, no effective external safeguards
against arbitrary interrogation presently protect the citizens of Northern
Ireland.
2. Trial
Those charged with crimes in Northern Ireland face further restric-
tions on their rights due to the EPA. The EPA creates a class of "sched-
uled" offenses that include a wide variety of crimes against persons or
property "commonly committed by terrorist groups in Northern Ire-
land."'45 The offenses are not necessarily political in nature,46 but are
39 Id. The power exists under the Magistrates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland), 1964, ch. 21,
§ 132, and the Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland), 1968, ch. 34, § 50(3).
40 EPA, supra note 20, § 14(1). If the person detained is to be held for a longer period, he may
be rearrested by a constable under § 11 or § 13. CuRRETrr LAW STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 14, general note
(1978). In an unscientific survey of Northern Irish citizens who had been arrested, 28.4% had been
arrested under § 14 of the EPA. Walsh, supra note 22, at 41.
41 The absence of a warrant requirement means there is no supervision or recourse in the judi-
cial system for what might be unjust arrests.
42 Walsh, supra note 22, at 49.
43 In the first 10 months of 1980, 8.6% of those arrested under the EPA were charged with a
scheduled offense. Id. at 39, table 1. Comparable charge rates in England and Wales average 80-
90%. Id. at 39.
44 REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL BRU-
TALrIY ARISING OUT OF EvENTs ON THE 9TH AUGUST 1971, 1971 CMND. SER. 5, No. 4823 (Chairman
Sir Edmund Compton) [hereinafter Compton Report]. The Compton Report revealed that suspects'
heads were covered with black hoods for long periods and they were exposed to continuous and
monotonous noise so as to make communication impossible. In addition, the report disclosed that
suspects were forced to stand against a wall with their legs apart and their hands raised against the
wall for six or seven hours at a time and that they were often deprived of food and sleep. Boyle,
Human Rights and Political Resolution in Northern Ireland, 9 YALEJ. WORLD PUB. ORD. 156, 165 (1982).
45 CURRENT LAw STAT. ANN., ch. 5, sched. 4, general note (1978).
46 Scheduled offenses include common law murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, false imprison-
ment, assault causing bodily harm, and riot. EPA, supra note 20, § 30, sched. 4.
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culled from other acts already in force.47 Those charged with scheduled
offenses are tried in different courts under different procedural and evi-
dentiary rules that favor the prosecution in a number of ways. 48
Specific crimes that appear to fall within the scope of the scheduled
offenses classification can be treated as nonscheduled by certification of
the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. 49 This certification proce-
dure is necessary "so as to exclude crimes which have no connection with
terrorism." 50 Thus, the only crimes effectively treated by the courts as
scheduled are those that the government believes are connected with ter-
rorism. Because terrorism is defined as "the use of violence for political
ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the pub-
lic or any section of the public in fear,"'5 1 those accused of committing
politically motivated crimes are subjected to a system ofjustice quite dis-
tinct from the one faced by ordinary, nonscheduled defendants.
The most noticeable of the differences between the two systems is
the absence of a right to trial by jury for those who commit scheduled
offenses. In scheduled offense cases, the judge sits as the finder of fact
and law, 52 whereas in cases involving nonscheduled offenses, the defend-
ant possesses the right to trial by jury.
This feature of the EPA has aroused considerable criticism and com-
mentary. Critics charge that conviction rates in scheduled offense cases
have increased in recent years because judges hearing such cases have
become case-hardened and are no longer as sympathetic towards defend-
ants as they once were. 53 Others question the ability ofjudges to rule on
the admissibility of evidence that a jury normally would not see while
continuing to serve as the finder of fact.54
Proponents of the EPA note that the system has eliminated the
problems of biased juries and intimidation of jurors by nationalist
groups. 55 These advocates of the EPA further point out that judges must
47 In addition to common law offenses, scheduled offenses are drawn from various statutes dat-
ing back to 1861 dealing with explosives, theft, terrorism, and other statutory crimes. For a full
listing of these acts, see id.
Over 50 classes of crimes are defined as scheduled. Anyone charged with committing a sched-
uled offense is subject to the EPA trial provisions unless the Secretary of State certifies that the case
is to be treated as nonscheduled. Id. § 30, sched. 4, note 2. There is no procedural framework for
this certification; it is an unappealable, nonjudicial process without standards, burdens of proof, or
right of representation.
48 Id. §§ 6-10. See also infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
49 EPA, supra note 20, § 30, sched. 4. See also CURRENT LAW STAT. ANN., ch. 5, sched. 4, note 2
(1978).
50 CURRENT LAW STAT. ANN., ch. 5, sched. 4, note 2 (1978).
51 EPA, supra note 20, § 31(1).
52 Id. § 7.
53 Between 1973 and 1979, the proportion of acquittals in trials of scheduled offenders fell from
15% to 6%. Carlton,Judging Without Consensus-The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland, 3 L. & POL'Y Q.
225, 234 (1981).
54 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NORTHERN IRELAND: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARD-
ING THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM, app. at 3-4 (1984) (Al Index: EUR 45/01/84) [hereinafter AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL].
55 A better solution may have been to end the freehold jury system. Because Protestants com-
prise a substantial majority of the property owners in the North, this system chose juries that were
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give reasons for convicting scheduled offenders56 and that such offenders
possess an automatic right of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal in
Northern Ireland.
57
Of deeper concern to opponents of the EPA are the evidentiary pro-
visions that greatly reduce the standards for admissibility of evidence in
trials of scheduled offenders. Any statement made by the accused is ad-
missible provided the court deems it relevant and does not exclude it on
other grounds. 58 The court will exclude the statement only if the accused
makes a prima facie showing that the security forces used torture or inhu-
man or degrading treatment to induce the statement.59
Northern Irish courts have had difficulty interpreting this new stan-
dard of admissibility. It is a marked departure from the common law
requirement of a showing that the defendant had given the statement
voluntarily.60 One judge interpreting the new standard concluded that
the standard "appears to accept a degree of physical violence which
could never be tolerated by the courts under the common law text and
... leaves it open to an interviewer to use a moderate degree of physical
maltreatment for the purpose of inducing a person to make a state-
ment." 61 Such a standard for admissibility encourages the use of inhu-
man measures in interrogation proceedings as investigators take
advantage of the gap between the new standard and the common law
standard to secure either a confession or intelligence information, or
both.62 Based on disclosures of past indiscretions on the part of officials
predominately Protestant; thus, these juries were susceptible to bias and were an easy target for
intimidation. LAw AND STATE, supra note 21, at 90-92.
The Criminal Justice Act, 1972, ch. 71, § 25, removed the property qualification forjury service
in favor of a registered voter system. This Act does not apply to Northern Ireland; the new jury
qualification scheme extends only to England and Wales. Id. at ch. 71, § 66(7).
56 EPA, supra note 20, § 5.
57 Id. at § 6. The effective scope of this appeal has been criticized. "[M]atters within the discre-
tion of the trial judge do not afford grounds of appeal and appellate review over the 'weighing' of the
evidence by the [judge] is very limited in scope." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 54, app. at 4.
58 EPA, supra note 20, § 8(1). One survey of the Diplock courts indicated that in 56% of the
cases tried the only evidence of guilt was a statement from the defendant. From 70% to 90% of the
convictions obtained were based wholly or mainly on admissions made to police. Foley, supra note
28, at 299 n.113.
59 EPA, supra note 20, § 8(2).
60 CURRENT LAw STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 8, general note (1978). The British case establishing the
common law standard is Kuruma v. Regina [1955] App. Cas. 197, 203. It is also codified in principle
(e) of the introduction to the judges' Rules:
It is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any person equally of
any oral answer given by that person to a question put to him by a police officer and of any
statement made by that person that it shall have been voluntary, in the sense that it has not
been obtained from him by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by
a person in authority, or by oppression.
Quoted in CURRENT LAW STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 8, general note (1978).
61 Quoted in CURRENT LAW STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 8, general note, subs. (2) (1978). Another court
has noted that "[tihere is no need now to satisfy the judge that a statement is voluntary in the
sometimes technical sense which that word has acquired in relation to criminal trials." Quoted in
CURRENT LAw STAT. ANN., ch. 5, § 8, general note (1978). Amnesty International identified this as
"the single most important issue" in determining the fairness of the trials in Diplock courts. AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 54, app. at 4.
62 "[W]here ill treatment less than torture, inhuman or degrading treatment was established in a
particular case as having been used to induce a statement, the admissibility of that statement in-
volved the exercise of the general judicial discretion to exclude evidence." CURRENT LAW STAT.
ANN., ch. 5, § 8, general note, subs. (2) (1978).
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interrogating suspects68 and the current lack of procedural safeguards
protecting suspects, 64 it is not safe to assume that all detainees will be
humanely treated by security forces.
Another consequence of the lowered evidentiary standards has been
the use of informant testimony against defendants charged with commit-
ting scheduled offenses. The government has used the testimony of
"supergrass" witnesses to convict large numbers of defendants during a
single proceeding.65 "Supergrass" witnesses are not volunteers; like
many informants in the United States, "supergrass" witnesses exchange
their testimony for immunity from prosecution or reduced sentences.
The testimony does not have to be corroborated by additional evi-
dence,66 and because there are no juries in trials of scheduled offenses,
the judge warns only himself of the inherent unreliability of such
testimony.
Convictions of large numbers of defendants may, and often do, rest
on the testimony of a single informant.67 Because pending charges will
be reduced or dropped in return for his testimony, the informant has
much to gain from testifying; he assumes a new identity after testifying,
and thus has little to lose.68 Allegations have been asserted that infor-
mants are fabricating incriminating testimony in response to threats of
prosecution by authorities.69 Because of the problems associated with
the "supergrass" trials, they have fallen into disrepute and are now less
frequently used than in the past.70 Their continued use, however, stands
as another example of how justice has been compromised in the North.
III. Article 3(a) Analysis of the Justice System in Northern Ireland
A. Judicial Standards for Article 3(a) Analysis
Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty will confer on
United States courts the power to examine the criminal justice system in
Northern Ireland when considering extradition requests. 7' This inquiry
should not take place in an informational vacuum. To provide a consis-
tent measure of the fairness of Northern Ireland's justice system, courts
should determine the rights and freedoms of the citizens of Northern
Ireland and should consider the system's impact on those rights.
It is reasonable to expect a country to respect those rights and free-
63 See supra note 44 & infra note 88 and accompanying text.
64 One of the chief criticisms of the existing reforms are that the guidelines for interrogation are
self-policed. No independent external authority investigates claims of brutality by security forces
during interrogations. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 28, at 322-24; Walsh, supra note 22, at 51-52.
65 "Grass" is the British nickname for informer. "Supergrass" refers to those who inform au-
thorities about large numbers of people and appear as the principal prosecution witnesses at their
trials. Green, Supergrass and the Legal System in Britain and Northern Ireland, 102 L.Q. REV. 198 (1986).
66 Id. at 203-05.
67 After 10 supergrass trials in Northern Ireland, 54% of those found guilty were convicted on
the basis of uncorroborated accomplice evidence. Id. at 240, 247.
68 Id. at 198.
69 Id. at 198-99.
70 Conviction rates have declined in recent supergrass trials as judges seem to be taking a more
critical view of the supergrass trial. Id. at 239-4 1. The Solicitors' Criminal Bar Association disfavors
supergrass trials. C. RICE, supra note 28, at 38.
71 See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
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doms that it explicitly recognizes as fundamental and that it agrees to
honor. The United Kingdom has recognized and has agreed to respect
those rights and freedoms listed in the European Convention on Human
Rights (Convention).72 However, the system ofjustice that Great Britain
has implemented in Northern Ireland significantly abridges these sup-
posedly recognized rights of the citizens of Northern Ireland. While the
justice system does not technically violate the principles of the Conven-
tion because of the "state of emergency" in effect in Northern Ireland,
the justice system nevertheless effectively violates many of the guaran-
teed rights and freedoms listed in the Convention.
The Convention specifically guarantees the following: the right to
life,73 freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, 74 the
right to liberty and security of person, 75 the right to a fair trial,76 the
right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, 77
and other significant basic human rights. 78
B. Analysis of the Justice System in Northern Ireland in Light of the
Guaranteed Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights
1. The Right to Life
The EPA empowers security personnel in Northern Ireland to stop
and detain citizens if they suspect that the citizen is involved in terrorist
activity. 79 When security personnel order a citizen to stop and he re-
fuses, the citizen does so at his peril. Recent cases brought against mem-
bers of the security forces suggest that in certain parts of Northern
72 The United Kingdom signed the Convention on November 4, 1950. Further protocols have
been signed; none of these subtract from the rights enumerated in the original convention. Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature, Nov. 4, 1950, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EU-
ROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTs 115 (10th ed. 1975) [hereinafter
CONVENTION].
73 Id. at 102, § 1, art. 2.
74 Id. at 103, § 1, art. 3.
75 Id. at art. 5. This right includes the assurance that arrest will be effected in order to bring
someone before competent judicial authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an of-
fense, or when it is considered reasonably necessary to prevent an offense from being committed, or
to prevent someone from fleeing after an offense has been committed. Id.
76 Id. at 104, § 1, art. 6.
77 Id. at 104-05, § 1, art. 8.
78 These basic rights include the following: freedom from slavery and servitude (Id. at 103, § 1,
art. 4); protection from ex post facto criminal law (Id. at 104, § 1, art. 7); freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion (Id. at 105, § 1, art. 9); freedom of expression (Id. at art. 10); freedom of
peaceful assembly and association (Id. at art. 11); the right to marry and to found a family (Id. at art.
12); the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions (Id. at 117, First Protocol, art. 1); the right
of parents to ensure education of children in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions (Id. at art. 2); the right to free elections by secret ballot (Id. at art. 3); freedom from
imprisonment for debt (Id. at 130, Fourth Protocol, art. 1); the right to liberty of movement, to
choose a residence, and freedom to leave any country (Id. at art. 2); freedom from exile, and the
right to enter the country of one's nationality (Id. at art. 3); prohibition of the collective expulsion of
aliens (Id. at art. 4). The Convention has created an enforcement mechanism, consisting of the
European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. CONVENTION,
supra note 72, at 106-07, § II, art. 19. The Commission considers applications from individuals and
states alleging violations of the Convention. If the Commission finds merit in the allegations, it
approves the application allowing the Court of Human Rights to hear the case. Since signing the
Convention in 1950, the United Kingdom has recognized this enforcement arm in numerous pro-
ceedings before the Court and the Commission.
79 See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
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Ireland security personnel may shoot to kill those who disobey orders to
stop. 0
The British government gives every soldier a Yellow Card that de-
scribes the conditions under which he is to fire his weapon. The card
forbids the firing of warning shots. Instead, the card instructs soldiers to
fire "aimed shots" if verbal warnings to stop are not heeded.8 1 Addition-
ally, the Special Air Services allegedly train police officers to "shoot to
kill" suspected terrorists.8 2 The result of this relatively undisciplined in-
struction regarding the use of lethal force is, according to one commen-
tator, "that the individual can hardly know for certain when he is liable to
be deprived of his most precious of rights, his life."
8 3
The use of rubber or plastic bullets by security forces has caused a
number of civilian deaths in Northern Ireland. Introduced in 1970 as a
means of riot control,84 the bullets appear to be used as more than just a
means of quelling violent disturbances. Numerous reports exist of
soldiers firing the bullets into otherwise peaceful gatherings.85 An inor-
dinate number of those injured by the bullets suffer head injuries even
though soldiers are supposedly instructed not to aim at the head.8 6 Such
use of deadly force is not consistent with the Convention's protection of
the right to life.
2. Freedom from Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
Complaints concerning the physical and mental abuse of detainees
by security forces appear to have decreased in recent years.8 7 While this
trend is welcome, the decrease is in part due to reforms instituted after
instances of severe abuse of Northern Irish detainees were disclosed in
the early 1970s. 8 Because those interrogating the detainees also en-
80 Spjut, The "Official" Use of Deadly Force by the Security Forces Against Suspected Terrorists: Some Les-
sons From Northern Ireland, 1986 PUB. L. 38, 57-59. Judges in two cases
decided that when a soldier is on patrol in a 'bad' area he would risk his own life and that of
others on patrol if he chased a suspect, because good tactical formation is essential to ob-
servation of terrorists who are waiting to ambush the patrol. Pursuit of the suspect, then, is
not an option open to a soldier or, for that matter, a police officer in a 'bad' area.
Id. at 55.
81 Id. at 55 & 55 n.10. These "aimed shots" are designed to kill a fleeing suspect, if one accepts
the reasoning of Lord Lowry, C.J., in one case brought against a soldier who had killed a civilian who
did not obey an order to halt. "Once the accused [soldier] made up his mind to fire, his training
would dispose him to fire at the centre of the target without having to make a conscious decision
whether his intention was to kill [the civilian]." Quoted in Spjut, supra note 80, at 55.
One judge went even further, dispensing with the third verbal warning required by the Yellow
Card. In that instance, the accused soldier "might have challenged a third time as the yellow card
specifies-if he had and the man had gone on and been shot at 50 metres would that have been
justifiable, whereas when he shot after two challenges at 15 metres it is not. I doubt if reasonable-
ness can depend upon such knife edge considerations." Quoted in Spjut, supra note 80, at 56.
82 Spjut, supra note 80, at 57. The Special Air Services is an elite branch of the British Armed
Forces. Police and government authorities deny this claim.
83 Id. at 64-65. In the period 1969-83, security forces killed 264 civilians during antiterrorist
operations in Northern Ireland. Id. at 66, annex.
84 C. RiCE, supra note 28, at 26; Boyle, supra note 44, at 172.
85 C. RICE, supra note 28, at 26-30.
86 Id. at 27 (citing a statement made in the House of Commons by Humphrey Atkins, former
Northern Ireland Secretary).
87 Walsh, supra note 22, at 51, table 6.
88 The British government investigated reports of physical and psychological abuse of detainees
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force any controls on methods of interrogation, it is indeed possible that
abuse of detainees still occurs.8 9 In addition, instances of verbal abuse
continue to be documented. 90 Judges routinely allow confessions of
scheduled offenders into evidence in trials even when the confessions are
the products of a "moderate degree of physical maltreatment." 91 United
States courts considering Northern Irish extradition requests must ask
themselves whether the degree of maltreatment presently allowed, even
under the "reformed" system, is consistent with contemporary notions of
humane treatment and justice.
3. The Right to Liberty and Security of Person
Article 5 of the Convention guarantees liberty of the person "in par-
ticular to provide guarantees against arbitrary arrest or detention. '92
and concluded that the following methods of interrogation were used: keeping detainees' heads
covered by a black hood except when alone or when being interrogated; submitting detainees to
continuous and monotonous noise to isolate them from communication; depriving detainees of
sleep; depriving detainees of food and water other than one pound of bread and one pint of water at
intervals of six hours; making the detainees stand facing a wall with their legs apart and their hands
raised against the wall for extended periods of time. O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the
European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 675
(1977).
Following reports of such abuse, the British government instituted a Committee of Enquiry to
investigate the allegations. See Compton Report, supra note 44. While confirming the use of such
techniques, the Compton Committee said the treatment did not constitute physical brutality, be-
cause those inflicting the punishment lacked the requisite mens rea. Compton Report, supra note 44,
para. 105, at 23. The Committee did not examine the psychological effects of such treatment.
Dissatisfaction with the Compton Report led to the establishment of a second committee,
chaired by Lord Parker. This committee examined the interrogation procedures to determine if
revision was required. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED TO CON-
SIDER AuTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM,
1972, CMND. SER. 5, No. 4901. The majority of the Parker Committee considered the use of the
techniques justifiable under the circumstances. They recommended only that safeguards be enacted
to limit excessive use of the techniques. Id. at 7-9, paras. 35-42. A minority of the committee dis-
agreed and believed that the use of such techniques violated domestic and international law. Id. at
14, para. 10(d). The British government officially discontinued the use of the five techniques on
March 2, 1972. O'Boyle, supra, at 679.
The Irish Republic was concerned with the use of the techniques and instituted proceedings
against the United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human Rights. The European
Commission on Human Rights accepted for consideration the application and approved submission
of the case to the European Court of Human Rights. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at 63.
The Commission found that the techniques constituted torture under the guidelines of the Con-
vention. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. at 66. Later, the Court changed that finding to one of
only inhuman and degrading treatment. Id. at 67.
Reports of abuse of detainees continued. After an Amnesty International mission to Northern
Ireland in 1977 that recommended further inquiry into interrogation practices, see AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND 55, 67 (1978) (AI
Index EUR 45/01/78), the British government established the Bennett Committee. This committee
examined interrogation procedures and made numerous recommendations designed to safeguard
the rights of detainees. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979, CMND. SER. 5, No. 7497.
Complaints of ill-treatment during interrogation have decreased since many of the Bennett
Committee's recommendations were implemented. Boyle, supra note 44, at 168.
89 Boyle, supra note 44, at 168; Walsh, supra note 22, at 51-52.
90 Nearly one-half of those answering an unscientific survey reported being subjected to verbal
abuse during interrogation. Walsh, supra note 22, at 49, table 5.
91 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
92 F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (1975).
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Subsection 1(c) of article 5 allows "the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence
or fleeing after having done so.''9" The regular practice of arresting citi-
zens for the purposes of internment or interrogation violates the ration-
ale underlying article 5.94 Internment in Northern Ireland has been
suspended since 1975, but the legal structure remains through which it
could be reimplemented. 95 Arrest for purposes of interrogation contin-
ues to be one of the major means of gathering intelligence in Northern
Ireland.96 The broad range of information gathered from these interro-
gations greatly exceeds what is required in order to bring specific indi-
viduals before the "competent legal authority" as permitted by article
5(1) (c).
4. The Right to a Fair Trial
The right to a fair trial has been abridged in Northern Ireland since
the recommendations of the Diplock Commission were embodied in the
EPA provisions controlling trials of scheduled offenses. 97 While the
Diplock Commission considered the fair trial requirements of article 6 of
the Convention,98 the Commission did not consider compliance with ar-
ticle 6 to be feasible in light of the "emergency" situation in Northern
Ireland. 99 In other words, the Commission admitted from the start that
93 CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 103, art. 5, § l(c).
94 The question of arrest for purposes of internment (indefinite detention without trial, see supra
note 32 and accompanying text) was litigated in Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961).
The Court of Human Rights found clear violations of articles 5(1)(c) and 5(3) of the Convention.
Lawless, 3 Eur. Ct. at 58. The government of Northern Ireland had not violated the Convention,
however, due to the existence of a "public emergency" in the country at the time of the internment.
Id. at 56-57.
The vast majority of those currently arrested under the EPA or the PTA are released without
charge following interrogation. Walsh, supra note 22, at 39 (89.5% of those arrested were released
without charge).
95 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
96 The scope of the information gathered is broad. In an unscientific survey of those arrested
for interrogation, only 28.3% recalled being asked about their involvement in specific incidents.
This at least partly explains why so few arrests result in filed charges. In contrast, 65% were ques-
tioned about their background and movements or those of their families and associates. Some were
shown photos surreptitiously taken and were asked to identify those in the pictures. Questions
about political attitudes and feelings were posed to 35% of those detained, and 35% of those de-
tained were urged to pass on information to the police or army. Walsh, supra note 22, at 49-50. "It
would seem, therefore, that both police and army are using their wide emergency powers of arrest
and detention to build up dossiers of information on the personal life, background, characteristics,
interests, and movements of individuals and possibly whole communities in Northern Ireland." Id. at
50.
97 The courts were created pursuant to report recommendations. Diplock Report, supra note 23.
See LAw & STATE, supra note 21, at 39-41.
98 Article 6 of the Convention protects the right to a fair trial. CONVENTION, supra note 72, at
104, art. 6.
99 In particular, the Diplock Report was concerned with the intimidation of witnesses. The
Diplock Commission considered internment to be the answer to that problem. Since the tribunals
considering internment of suspects could not allow state witnesses to be cross-examined because of
concerns about possible intimidation of those witnesses, the fair trial requirements of article 6 could
not be met. The solution to this dilemma was to make the internment process an extrajudicial pro-
cess not involving the courts. There can be no derogation from minimal fair trial standards, the
reasoning continued, if there is no court involved. Twining, Emergency Powers and Criminal Process: The
Diplock Report, 1973 CRIM. L.R. 406, 413-14.
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the recommended dichotomous court system, later embodied in the
EPA, would not produce a fair trial according to the Convention's stan-
dards. Proceeding from this assumption that the article 6 requirements
could not be respected, the Diplock Report recommended a judicial sys-
tem designed to effect the objectives of the elimination of intimidation
and the containment of terrorism. Although the ends are laudable, the
various means employed to achieve those ends do not serve the interests
of the citizens of Northern Ireland because of the consistent disregard
for human rights. 0 0 United States courts must decide ifjuryless trials,
lowered evidentiary standards, admission of coerced statements of the
accused, and conviction on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testi-
mony are features of a system of justice that meets "even minimal stan-
dards within a democratic context."''1 1
5. The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and
Correspondence
The expansive powers that the EPA grants to security personnel to
search the premises where a person has been arrested may violate article
8 of the Convention. 0 2 While the courts have not explored the limits of
article 8,103 it is questionable whether the broad powers to search satisfy
the letter or spirit of the Convention. 0 4 Security forces do not need a
warrant to search; indeed, what authorization that is required comes not
from the judiciary but from the Secretary of State. The civil rights pro-
tections in the EPA search and seizure provisions are minimal; the poten-
tial for abuse of these provisions is great.
Apparently, abuses of these search powers do occur. Between 1971
and 1978, security forces searched homes over 300,000 times.10 5 This
figure is, numerically, approximately seventy-five percent of the house-
holds in Northern Ireland.'0 6 Although the figure includes repeated
searches of single dwellings, the scale on which these intrusions occur is
still enormous. The searches are typically very thorough; they are gen-
eral in scope rather than specific. The searches may be based on a vari-
ety of suspicions concerning the connection of the home or its occupants
to scheduled offenses.' 07 The apparent abuse of such broad powers does
100 See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 19.
102 "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspon-
dence." CoNVEmxoN, supra note 72, at 104-05, art. 8.
103 F.JAcoBs, supra note 92, at 126-27.
104 Section 19 of the EPA empowers a soldier to "enter any premises or other place ... if he
considers it necessary to do so in the course of operations for the preservation of the peace or the
maintenance of order." Additionally, if authorized by the Secretary of State, soldiers may seize or
destroy property and interfere with private or public rights in property.
Chapter 5, § 14(3) of the EPA further empowers soldiers to enter and search any premises
where a person subject to arrest is, or, if the person is suspected of being a terrorist, where they
suspect that person may be.
105 C. RICE, supra note 28, at 24; Foley, supra note 28, at 294.
106 Foley, supra note 28, at 294.
107 Section 15 of the EPA authorizes searches for the purpose of uncovering munitions or radio
transmitters. A dwelling-house is to be searched only if there is suspicion that the items sought are
on the premises. Section 17 allows security forces to enter and search any premises where they
suspect a person is held hostage. Section 13 allows a constable, once he enters any premises for the
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not guarantee the rights of the citizens of Northern Ireland; United
States courts should take notice of such abuses when considering extradi-
tion requests.
C. The "Emergency" Situation in Northern Ireland
Great Britain justifies the limitations placed on the civil rights of the
citizens of Northern Ireland by noting the levels of violence that have
destabilized the country and the continuing efforts to undermine the
Unionist/British rule in the province. Since 1961, such justifications have
precluded any finding that Great Britain has violated the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.' 08 Article 15(1) of the Convention provides
for derogation from the provisions of the convention "[iun time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation"' 09 and re-
quires only that the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe be kept
fully informed of the measures taken and the reasons for those
measures.110
Under the standards of the Convention, an emergency situation has
existed in Northern Ireland since 1957.111 The existence of a protracted
state of emergency in Northern Ireland has, in the eyes of the Court of
Human Rights, justified the United Kingdom's breaches of the Conven-
tion in the years since 1957.112
This supposed state of emergency is perhaps the most disturbing of
the many issues that United States courts will face when considering re-
quests for the extradition of Northern Irish citizens. The fact that the
emergency situation is now in its thirtieth year suggests that the "emer-
gency" has become the status quo. In fact, emergency legislation of one
kind or another has been in effect since 1922." 3 An entire generation
purpose of arresting a suspect, to seize anything that he considers suspect. Under § 14(3) soldiers
may search any premises where they suspect terrorists may be. As with the power to arrest on suspi-
cion of being a terrorist (§ 14(1)), this power is open to widespread abuse.
Typically, security forces could go to the home of a citizen to arrest that person "on suspicion of
being a terrorist." As illustrated earlier, the level of suspicion required for such an arrest is low, and
no warrant requirement exists. Once in the home to effect the arrest, the forces would then be free
to conduct a general search of the entire home, seizing anything that they consider suspicious. C.
RicE, supra note 28, at 24-26.
108 See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). The court defined the circumstances as "an exceptional situation of
crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life
of the community of which the State is composed." Lawless, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31.
109 CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 106, art. 15.
110 Id.
111 On July 15, 1957, the government of Northern Ireland put into force extraordinary powers to
secure public peace and order. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was informed of
these measures by a letter dated July 20, 1957. The government, in response to the Lawless case,
argued that during the period of time covered by the Lawless case a state of emergency under article
15(1) existed which justified the measures taken. The court agreed with the government. Lawless, 3
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56-57. The ruling in Lawless has no bearing on whether such a state of
emergency may exist at present.
112 The court held that the internment practiced in the Lawless case appeared to be a "measure
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." Id at 59. The court's decision has no preceden-
tial effect on subsequent actions taken by the government in future situations.
113 Seesupra note 21.
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has been raised under various laws that restrict personal liberties and
freedoms in the name of the emergency situation.
United States courts must decide whether the means used to control
politically motivated violence in Northern Ireland should be supported
by allowing the extradition of persons suspected of having committed
scheduled offenses. The security forces now employ the EPA to amass
detailed intelligence about the private lives of Catholics and Protestants
alike, significantly abridging citizens' rights in the process. In addition,
confessions of dubious reliability have become the basis for the majority
of convictions in thejuryless Diplock courts that adjudicate politically re-
lated offenses. The Northern Irish live in justifiable fear of the "security"
forces. They fear arrest and interrogation. They fear being shot if they
disobey an order to halt. They fear methods of crowd control that injure
and kill. In such an environment, fine questions of whether an "emer-
gency" exists which would somehow justify what is, in effect, the state-
sponsored terrorism of its own citizens do not seem appropriate. What
seems appropriate are constructive actions that work towards building a
system ofjustice where human rights are respected and protected. Peo-
ple cannot be expected to respect the rights of their fellow man when
their government does not do so.
The justification for this system of justice is supposedly the ends it
seeks to achieve. However, it is questionable whether the ends that have
been achieved in Northern Ireland are the ends toward which contempo-
rary democracies should strive. An atmosphere of abuse and repression
will only breed resentment, fear, and contempt for the justice system
among the Northern Irish people. Such sentiments cannot be converted
into constructive action and cannot be the basis for an improved North-
ern Irish society.
IV. Conclusion
In future extradition cases where the United Kingdom is the request-
ing party, the Supplementary Extradition Treaty empowers courts to
consider the system ofjustice in Northern Ireland before granting or de-
nying extradition. Where the request is based on a conviction or allega-
tion of committing a scheduled offense under the EPA, courts should
deny the request.' 14 In so doing, courts in the United States will be em-
ploying article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty in a manner that will
benefit the citizens of Northern Ireland as a whole, and will encourage
the government of Great Britain to protect the rights of those citizens.
Until such time as meaningful changes are made in the entire system
of justice in Northern Ireland, changes that respect the human and civil
rights of the Northern Irish, the United Kingdom should realize that
114 Courts may wish to consider whether the justice system in Northern Ireland is an appropriate
subject for judicial notice. The provisions restricting human and civil rights are plain, and apply with
particular force to any Northern Irish citizen charged with the commission of a scheduled offense.
Some American courts have taken judicial notice of the existence of a state of uprising in Northern
Ireland, see, e.g., In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in
132 CONG. REC. S9146-147 (daily ed.July 16, 1986). Extending this to recognizing the unfairness of
the attendant system ofjustice is a reasonable next step.
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courts in the United States will be closely examining the existing system
when determining whether the article 3(a) criteria have been met. The
inherently political nature of the scheduled offenses brings them within
the purview of article 3(a) as evidenced by the political definition of "ter-
rorist" scheduled offenses, and the separate system of justice to which
scheduled defendants are subject.
Undoubtedly, tensions will result as United States courts deny extra-
dition requests of the United Kingdom; however, such tension may
prompt meaningful change in the justice system of Northern Ireland.
United States courts should take advantage of this unique opportunity to
influence the administration of justice in Northern Ireland and should
send a strong signal to Great Britain that the time has come for a change
by denying extradition requests for any fugitive of Northern Ireland
charged with or convicted of a scheduled offense.
Kelly D. Talcott
